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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DERON BRUNSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Vs. 
THE BANK OF NEW YORK 
MELLON, et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20110854 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
And 
Demand for Transparency 
DEMAND FOR TRANSPARENCY 
A decision rendered by the appellate court judge(s) on this appeal without 
specifically addressing the issues raised within this brief constitutes a denial of due 
process in that Appellant cannot know if his pleading was heard in its entirety. 
Addressing the issues raised by Appellant gives transparency which proves that his brief 
was properly viewed and adjudicated thus protecting Appellant's right of due process. 
Appellant hereby demands from the Utah Court of Appeals a transparent decision 
demonstrating the issues raised in this appeal were addressed thus protecting Appellant's 
rights of due process—the right to be heard. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order dated August 13, 2010 of the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah of the Honorable Paul Maughn 
l 
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presiding. This appeal is authorized by Utah Code Ann. §78A-5-102(1) & (6) and §78A-
4-103(1) & (2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1, Whether the trail court erred by treating a hearing on a temporary 
restraining order as though it was a hearing on a motion to dismiss which 
blindsided Appellant. 
A motion to dismiss is reviewed under a correctness standard, Debry v. Valley 
Mortgt Co., 835 p.2d 1000 (Utah app. 1992) 
The final order stems from a hearing on a motion for temporary restraining order 
filed by Appellant. At that hearing the court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss which 
Appellant had never seen nor had Appellant received any copy of such pleading. 
Appellant was denied his due process right to respond to Defendants' motion to 
dismiss. 
Due process rights is reviewed under a correctness standard, Huish v. Munro, 
2008 UT App 283 191 P.3d 1242: 
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
" . . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
[Petitioner's home], without due process of law..." (Brackets added) 
2 
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Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states: 
". . . No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property [Petitioner's 
home], without due process of law." {Brackets added). 
Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
". . . Within 10 days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition." 
Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: * '* 
". . . If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision." 
Goldim v. Ashley Cent. Irr. CO., 902 P.2d 142 (Utah 1995) "If neither party files 
a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision." Utah Code of 
Jud.Admin.R.4-501(l)(d)." 
Appellant hereby incorporates paragraph no. 10 of his docketing statement as 
though stated fully herein. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
". . . Within 10, days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition." 
Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
". . . If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision." 
3 
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S T A T E M E I N r H E C A S E 
On July 27, 2010 Appellant appeared at a hearing on his temporary restraining 
order At the top of the hearing the court asked Appellant " Mr. Brunson, why shouldn't I 
sanction?" See Transcript page 4 ^ {18-20. The stage upon which this question was asked 
was not set up and Appellant had no idea why the court had asked this question. After 
"Combined Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss And Opposition To Plaintiff's 
"VerifiedEmergency Motion For Temporary Restraining Order ("Combined Motion") 
which was almost 300 pages long, this was placed into the mail the day before 
be the only reason why the court threatened Appellant with sanctions because the court 
had stated that it had read the file, see transcript page 4 ]f 24, and the Combined Motion 
w as oi i file . . , : - • • •.- • • .•. • 
Appellant was blindsided by Appellee's Combined Motion, nowhere at any time 
during the hearing was Appellant informed of Appellee's motion to dismiss. And the 
ecu in I cilsi nissecl tl le case pi n si lai it lo A ppellee's i notioi 11 :: disn liss. See the Order page 6 
]f 2. Appellant filed an objection to this order on August 2nd, 2010. 
The whole of the transcript reflects that the court asked questions inspired by 
Appelee's motion to dismiss. These questions prejudiced Appellant in that they were 
raisu 'd b \ Ih i ' i o u i l nlim/ln phut vd A p p d h i n l m lln. p o s i l n mi In H I ' U C w null d i e n u u l if 
4 
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Appellant sought to overcome these questions. These questions helped Appellees to the 
demise of Appellant. The court in asking these types of questions forces an argument 
between the court and Appellant which prejudices Appellant because in such arguments 
the court shares no liability. The court does not loose anything regardless of the outcome 
of such arguments while the Appellant has everything on the line. The court helped 
Appellee to the demise of Appellant when the court did not inform Appellant that it was 
basing it's decision and questions on Appelle's motion to dismiss. This prejudiced 
Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant filed a Verified Complaint on July 20, 2010. 
Appelle's were properly served with the summons and complaint. 
Appellant filed a verified emergency motion and memorandum for temporary 
restraining order ("TRO") on July 20, 2010. 
A hearing for Appellant's TRO was set for July 27th 2010 upon which Appellee 
and Appellant appeared. 
On July 26th, 2010, one day before the hearing, Appellant filed their "Combined 
Motion". 
During the said hearing the court dismissed Appellant's complaint pursuant to 
Appellee's Combined Motion. 
The record does not reflect that Appellant had any knowledge of Appellee's 
Combined Motion. 
5 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court blindsided Appellant and sided with Appellee when it ruled in favor of 
Appellee's motion to dismiss (Combined Motion). 
to dismiss. 
The court prejudiced Appellant when it pursued questions addressed to Appellant 
that favored Appellee that were not within the scope o. Appellant" s I RO. 
F or these reasons the ordei should be re\ ersed. 
ARGUMENT 
response Appellees filed a "Motion To Dismiss" and a "Combined Memorandum in 
Support of Motion To Dismiss And Opposition To Plaintiffs "Verified Emergency 
Motion I bf Temporary Restraining Order ; t ,)mbinea Motion") which was almost 300 
pages long, tl lis w as placed " • . : 
Temporary Restraining Order that was held at 1 lam on July 27, 2010. 
The granting of this Combined Motion denied Appellant's right to file an 
opposition, it also n nunmrnled tin biw m quii'iu^ llial "\ppellees oi Appellanl iniiisl hirst 
file a request to submit for decision or the said motion will not be submitted for a 
decision. Neither party filed a request as required by law. 
Rule 7(c) oi the \ Jtah R ules of Cr \ ill! I >rocedure states: 
6 
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". . . Within 10 days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition." 
Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
". . . If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision." 
Also pursuant to Goldim v. Ashley Cent. Irr. CO., 902 P.2d 142 (Utah 1995) it 
states "If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision." Utah Code of Jud.Admin.R. 4-501(l)(d)." 
Nowhere in law does it allow for a Defendant to file a motion to dismiss in such a 
way that it can be heard and granted without the Plaintiff having been informed. The 
controlling legal authority above is clear on the proper procedures in filing a motion to 
dismiss. This Appellee's did not do. 
Also the way Appeelee's motion to dismiss was entertained and granted 
denied Appellant's due process right to be heard in opposition. "The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner." See Huish v. Munro* 2008 UT App 283 191 P.3d 
1242. n 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states " . . . nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property [Petitioner's home], without due 
process of law..." (Brackets added), and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
7 
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states " . . . No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property [Petitioner's home], 
without due process of law." {Brackets added). 
In addition, the self evident doctrine of The Object Principle of Justice suggests 
that in civil court where life or property is not at jeopardy by the hands of a government 
agency, a party who invokes any legal authority cannot be violated by the court, nor can 
the court make its own judicial determination or invoke its own legal findings in 
opposition to the legal authority invoked by a party in court. In acting in opposition to 
this theory the court would become guilty of helping one party to the demise of the other 
party, this the court cannot do if it wants to be just. In order for the court to be just it 
must render its decision based upon the pleadings before the court regardless of how 
wrong they both may be. This doctrine is self evident in support of justice. 
In Resort Retainers v. Labor Commission, 2010 UT App 229 it states that "Due 
process challenges are questions of law that we review applying a correction of error 
standard" 
The court erred when it entertained and granted Respondents Combined Motion 
which denied Appellants right to responded under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
And the court erred when it granted the Combined Motion upon which 
Respondent did not file a request for hearing. 
Even though Appellant was denied his right to oppose Respondents' Combined 
Motion, Respondents Combined Motion invoked the following laws that guides a motion 
8 
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to dismiss upon which the court did not allow Appellant to present. For example, the 
standard for obtaining a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a high one. St. Benedict's 
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, T96 (Utah 1991) (citing 61 A 
Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 227 (1981)). "A rule 12b(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts 
alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based upon those 
facts." 
And in Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co.. 790 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citations omitted) it states "A motion to dismiss will be affirmed only where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of its claims." And a reviewing court is . . . . "obliged 
to construe the complaint in light most favorable to the plaintiff and to indulge all 
reasonable inferences in its favor." 
And in Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.< 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (citations 
omitted) it states "The courts are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any 
doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of factual basis, the issue 
should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to present its proof." 
In Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306 (citations omitted) it states "A rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss addresses only the sufficiency of the pleadings, and therefore, 
"is not an opportunity for the trial court to decide the merits of the case."" 
Instead the court tried the merits of the case with interrogating questions that were 
outside of the scope of Appellant for and in behalf of Appellee. 
9 
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At the top of the hearing when the court threatened sanctions this put Appellant on 
the defense against the court, and not knowing why the court was seeking sanctions, and 
thinking that the purpose of the sanctions had something to do with the TRO, and when 
the court started addressing the merits of the case, which Appellant was not prepared to 
do, this blindsided Appellant upon which he was not given a fair hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The court blindsided Appellant and sided with Appellee when it ruled in favor of 
Appellee's motion to dismiss (Combined Motion), and the the court denied Appellant's 
right to be heard in opposition to Appellee's motion to dismiss, and the court prejudiced 
Appellant when it pursued questions addressed to Appellant that favored Appellee that 
were not within the scope of Appellant's TRO. For these reasons Appellant moves the 
court to reverse the Order and order appellees' to answer the complaint. 
Dated this 9th day of April, 2012. 
DeronBrunson 
Pro se and Appellant 
10 
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™*5SSS8f» 
Darren K. Nelson (7946) 
Michael D. Black (9132) 
John P. Snow (10735) 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS , 
185 South State St., Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants The Bank of New York Mellon fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee 
for the Certificate Holders CWalt, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2005-58 Mortgage Pass-Through 
Certificates; Series 2005-58, and ReconTrust Company, N.A. 
: IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DERONBRUNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
V S . • ;• 
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 
FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS 
TRUSTEE FOR THE 
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC., 
ALTERNATTVE LOAN TRUST 2005-58 
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH 
CERTIFICATES; SERIES 2005-58, and 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., and 
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC and 
JOHN DOES OF UNKNOWN NUMBER, 
Defendants. 
| ORDER DENYING 
j MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
l RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE 
Case No. 100913085 
Judge Paul Maughan 
•• : • 
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This matter came on for hearing on July 27,2010, at 11:00 a.m. before the Court, the 
Honorable Paul G. Maughan, for consideration of plaintiff Deron Branson's ("Brunson") Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") against defendants The Bank of New York Mellon 
fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWalt, Inc., Alternative Loan 
Trust 2005-58 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates; Series 2005-58, ("BNY") and ReconTrust 
Company, N.A. ("ReconTrust'') (collectively referred to as "Defendants"). Brunson appeared 
pro se and Defendants were represented by Darren K. Nelson of the law firm of Parr Brown Gee 
& Loveless. 
The Court having heard the oral argument of the parties, having fully and carefully 
reviewed the file, including the pleadings filed in Case No. 090909512, Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy, and having 
stated the Court's findings, conclusions and ruling on the record, the Court finds as follows: 
1. On or about August 8,2005, Brunson obtained a loan in the principal amount of 
one million dollars (the "Loan) to fund the purchase of a home located at 14772 South Golden 
Leaf Ct., Draper, Utah (the "Property"). 
2. Brunson failed to fulfill his payment obligations under the terms of the Loan. 
ReconTrust as trustee of the Trust Deed securing the Loan began non-judicial foreclosure efforts 
during the first few months of 2009. 
3. Brunson filed a lawsuit in Third District Court, Case No. 090909512 (the 
"Concluded Lawsuit"), by filing his Verified Complaint on or about June 8,2009, against 
345650.1 
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Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide") and ReconTrust. Countrywide is the se it vice i 
of the Loan, and 'ReconTrust is the trustee of the Trust Deed securing the Loan. 
4. Countrywide and ReconTrust responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss Hrmison" s 
Verified Complaint, in the Concluded 
Branson quickly amended his Complaint by filing a Verified Amended 
on or about July 2,2009. Country wide and ReconTrust filed a Motion to' Dismiss the Amended 
Verified Complaint on July,22,2009. 
6. Branson filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on July 28, 
2005 
7. On August 7,2009, Countryv \\\ and h wionTrust filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support; of Motion to Dismiss. 
8. On September 8,2009, a hearing was held (tk "Hearing") before Judge John 
Paul Kenned in which the Court heard arguments concerning the Motion to Dismiss. 
9. On September 21,2009, Judge Kennedy entered a final order (the "Final Order") 
granting the \ Motion to Dismiss. 
Branson filed aNotice of Appeal on SepternlR!i / I ' HJ'9 
11. i In I December 17,2009, the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Branson's appeal in 
the Concluded Lawsuit. 
Branson filed a Writ of Certiorari. The Utah Supreme Court denied Branson's 
Petition for Writ Certiorari on April 22,2010. 
345650.1 
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13. In the Concluded Lawsuit, Brunson pled a cause of action against the defendants 
for "wrongful foreclosure." 
14. In the Concluded Lawsuit, Brunson made allegations that the defendants were 
foreclosing a Trust Deed that was allegedly "void." 
15. In the Concluded Lawsuit, Brunson made allegations that the Loan was 
securitized and sold for more than the aggregate amount without giving Brunson any excess 
funds. Brunson alleged that the securitization of the Loan caused him damage. 
16. In the Concluded Lawsuit, Brunson alleged that the defendants should repay him 
the sum of $352,190.30. 
17. Brunson filed this lawsuit on July 20,2010 (the "Instant Action"). 
18. In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges causes of action against the defendants for 
"wrongful foreclosure" of the same Loan and same Property. 
19. In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges causes of action against defendants for 
damages in the identical amount of $352,190.30, as alleged in the Concluded Lawsuit. 
20. In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges that the Trust Deed is "void" through the 
securitization of the subject Loan, as he did in the Concluded Lawsuit. 
21. In the Instant Action, Brunson alleges that the "Substitution of Trustee is not 
dated, signed or notarized." Despite Plaintiffs verified allegation, the Substitution of Trustee 
provided to the Court is notarized, and recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
22. In the Instant Action, Plaintiff alleges that the Notice of Default and Election to 
Sell is neither signed nor notarized. However, the Notice of Default and Election to Sell 
4 
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pro'videci to the Court shows that the subject document was recorded in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office and acknowledged apinropn\w\y. 
23 Like the Concluded Lawsuit, in the Instant Action, Plaintiff e^cics an. order from 
this Court declaring that the I nisi IJ'txill u, "mi a lien."1 against the Property. 
24. The Instant Action, as well as the Concluded Lawsuit, pertains to the same I .oan, 
the same Property, the same foreclosure, the &arruj, Trust Deed, and the same remedies sought for 
by Brunson against the named defendants. 
25. Countrywide is the servicer of the I oan BNY is the beneficiary of the Trust 
I kTid, ami KcconTrust is the Trustee of the Trust Deed. 
26. Brunson was instructed by Judge Kennedy in the Concluded Lawsuit that the 
allegations a i id causes of actions filed by Brunson were frivolous. Nonetheless, Brunson chose 
to file the Instant Action, once again seeking the remed I * i ongful foreclosure, among other 
things." 
Brunson has failed to meet his burden of RnUiMishinp a TRO pursuant to Rule 
65(b) of the Utah HiUes of Civil Procedure. 
28 Fhe Court finds that the Instant Action is barred by huh L I aim preclusion and 
issue preclusion, as airgiii ill! hv the defendants. 
19 The Court finds that the Instant Action, w frwmou1, «/ithmn merit, and not 
brought oi, guud faith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
5 
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1. Brunson's Motion for TRO is DENIED; 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and this case shall be dismissed, with 
prejudice on the merits; 
3. Defendants are awarded reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $2,944.00 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. 
4. Plaintiff is ordered not re re-file this case anew. 
Dated this JX day of 55!}, 2010. 
BY THE COURT; 
Paul. G M^ghdn^, /uf.'s,;^; 
District Cotirt Jii^^^jCi^J 
345650.1 
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